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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee 
v. 
KATHERINE H. CAPELL-
Defendant/appellant 
Case No. 930493-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from an order revoking defendant's 
probation for a conviction, pursuant to a guilty plea, for 
attempted distribution of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§58-37-4(2)(b)(i)(D), 58-
37-8 (1) (a) (ii) , 58-37-8 (1) (b) (i) , 58-37-8(7) (Supp. 1993). 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the case pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3 (2) (f) (Supp. 1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court abuse its discretion by revoking 
defendant's probation based on defendant's subsequent commission 
of the crime of retail theft? 
"A determination to revok* probation is within the 
discretion of the trial court. We will reverse only if the 
evidence, when viewed in a light most favorable to the court's 
decision, J :• sc deficient that it must be conclude 1 the trial 
court abused its discretion. Furthermore, the court's underlying 
factual findings supporting its conclusion that defendant 
violated probation will not be disturbed unless they are clearly 
erroneous." State v. Ruesqa, 851 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Utah App. 
1993) (citations omitted). 
speculative 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The pertinent part of §77-18-1 (Supp. 1993), statute is 
contained in Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant Katherine H. Capellan was charged by Information 
on January, 19, 1990, with one count of attempted distribution of 
a controlled substance, in violation of §§58-37-4(2) (b) (i) (D), 
58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) , 58-37-8 (1) (b) (i) , 58-37-8(7) (Supp. 1993) (R. 
7). Defendant was released on her own recognizance to Pre-Trial 
Services (R. 10). Defendant entered a plea of guilty to the 
crime of attempted unlawful distribution of a controlled 
substance (R. 22). Defendant was sentenced to a term not to 
exceed five years in the Utah State Prison and to pay a fine of 
$5,000. 
Defendant was granted a stay of the execution of the prison 
term and fine on condition that she remain under the supervision 
of the Utah State Department of Adult Probation and Parole for 
thirty-six (36) months (R. 30-31). 
The court ordered the following special conditions of 
probation: 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the 
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Department of Adult Probation and Parole.1 
Pay a fine in the amount of $400 at a rate to be 
determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole, plus a surcharge of $100, for a total of $500. 
Pay restitution in the amount of $64 0 at a rate to be 
determined by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
Complete 150 hours of community service restitution as 
directed by the Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
(R. 30-31). 
On April 1, 1993, Tamra Shadoan, defendant's probation 
officer from the Utah State Department of Correction, filed an 
Order to Show Cause requiring defendant to appear before the 
court. Defendant was to appear in court and answer allegations 
that she had violated her parole by failing to make regular 
restitution, fine, recoupment or Substance Aouse Prevention 
Account payments or failed to perform community service or obtain 
employment and/or education (R. 24-25). On April 19, 1993, the 
court held an evidentiary hearing to determine if defendant had 
violated the parole agreement by failing to make regular 
payments. Defendant admitted allegations of non-payment but 
denied allegations that she had not completed any community 
lfThis provision incorporates general requirements with which 
defendant must comply in order to remain on probation. Although 
those general requirements are not specifically set out in the 
record or transcript, it is presumed that the "fifth condition" at 
issue in the case is a requirement that defendant not violate any 
state or local law. This presumption is based on the language 
contained in the May 28, 1993, Order to Show Cause which provides 
defendant violated probation by committing retail theft, a 
violation of state law (R. 33 & 34) . 
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service or obtained education and/or employment (R. 28). 
Defendant's probationary status was extended for thirty-six (36) 
months and defendant was ordered to seek or obtain employment, 
make financial payments and comply with all other terms of 
probation (R. 28-29) . 
On May 28, 1993, Tamra Shadoan filed an affidavit supporting 
a notice of probation violation which resulted in a second Order 
to Show Cause requesting that defendant admit or deny charges 
that she: 1) pled guilty to retail theft, a class B misdemeanor, 
a violation of condition number 5 of the probation agreement; 2) 
pled guilty to retail theft, a class A misdemeanor, a violation 
of condition number 5 of the probation agreement and 3) committed 
the offense of retail theft, a violation of condition number 5 of 
the probation agreement (R. 33, 34, 38, & 39). 
Defendant appeared and denied the allegations in the 
affidavit (R. 42). An evidentiary hearing was held at which the 
trial court found defendant had violated the conditions of her 
probation. Probation was revoked and defendant was committed to 
the Utah State Prison pursuant to the Judgment and Sentence (R. 
46 St 47) . 
On June 25, 1993, the trial court entered a Judgment and 
Commitment which provides in pertinent part: 
The State's order to show cause hearing comes now 
before the Court for disposition. The defendant 
appears in person and is represented by Lynn Brown as 
Counsel, The State being represented by Paul Parker as 
Counsel. Based on the representations of Counsel for 
the Defense and Counsel for the State, the Court finds 
that the defendant has violated the terms of her 
probation and the same is revoked. The Court orders 
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the defendant committed to the Utah State Prison in 
accordance with the sentence heretofore imposed. 
Commitment is to issue forthwith. 
(R 52) . 
Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal alleging that the 
probation revocation was in error and that this Court should 
vacate the lower court's ruling. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant, at the order to show cause hearing, was 
represented by Brook Wells from the Legal Defender Association. 
Defendant's attorney of record, Lynn Brown, was out of town at 
the time of the hearing (R. 68). Defendant denied any probation 
violation and the matter was set for an evidentiary hearing (R. 
68) . 
At the order to show cause hearing the prosecutor requested 
statements in the affidavit for the order to show cause be 
amended to allege that defendant had violated her probation by 
committing the offense of retail theft, in place of the language 
that stated defendant pled guilty to retail theft (R. 68-69). In 
discussing the necessity of witnesses and the sufficiency of 
evidence to be presented at the evidentiary hearing, defendant's 
attorney, stated: 
It is my understanding that the Str.te believes that she 
has entered pleas of guilty in at ^east one of these. 
She indicates another was dismissed. The evidentiary 
hearing, I believe, would merely necessitate the minute 
entries or the judgments showing which matters have 
been resolved. 
(R. 69). Defendant's counsel also indicated that defendant was 
"doing at least a six-month jail sentence on one of these 
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matters," and therefore the evidentiary hearing could be set for 
June 21, 1993 (R. 71). 
At the evidentiary hearing on the probation violation, the 
State alleged three violations(R. 33-34). However, the court 
docket sheets which were being used by the prosecution to prove 
defendant had been convicted of two of the crimes failed to 
reflect the proper dates.2 
As for the third, the State relied on the certified docket 
sheet reflecting defendant's May 28, 1993, guilty plea into 
evidence (R. 85-86).3 The court held that the docket sheet 
evidencing defendant's guilty plea to the charge of retail theft 
was sufficient to show she committed the crime (R. 93). 
Defendant objected on the grounds that the docket sheet 
Allegation number one could not be proved by the docket sheet 
obtained by the probation officer from a circuit court in Layton. 
The date of the conviction was October, 1992, and the date of the 
offense alleged in the affidavit for the order to show cause was 
April, 1993. Allegation number two could not be proved as the 
circuit court in Murray did not provide the probation officer with 
a copy of the conviction. The prosecution, therefore, moved to 
dismiss counts one and two. The only count to be tried at the 
evidentiary hearing was count three, the conviction relating to the 
offense on May, 11, 1993, adjudicated in Third Circuit Court in 
Salt Lake City (R. 81-86) . 
3Despite the fact that defendant's counsel in the order to 
show cause hearing, Ms. Wells, had agreed to the use of court 
docket sheets to show that defendant committed the alleged offense, 
Mr. Brown stated: 
With regard to allegation number three they've alleged 
that she committed the offense of retail theft and 
there's been no proof that she committed any offense of 
retail theft. When you want to bring evidence with 
respect to that you have to put on witnesses that prove 
that she stole something on such and such a date. 
There's no such proof here today. 
(R. 86). 
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indicated that defendant was not represented by counsel but it 
did not indicate whether or not defendant had made a knowing and 
voluntary waiver of counsel (R. 88-93) . Additionally, defendant 
argued the docket sheet did not reflect that defendant's plea was 
knowing and voluntary, in effect it violated Rule 11 of the Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, because defendant was not made aware 
that her guilty plea could result in the revocation of her 
probation in the earlier felony conviction (R. 88-93) . However, 
defendant failed to provide the trial court with a copy of any 
documentation from the plea hearing or a copy or transcript of 
the tape of the hearing in order to support his allegations (R. 
73). Defendant called no witnesses to testify regarding the 
waiver of an attorney or the guilty plea (R. 86). Nor did she 
provide the court with any case law to support her claims that 
the alleged defects made the plea invalid for use in a probation 
revocation hearing (R. 89-90) . 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Defendant's probation revocation was based on the act of 
violating the law by committing retail theft; it was not based on 
the act of pleading guilty to retail theft. Therefore, in order 
to prove a violation of probation, the State sufficiently 
established the commission of the act by producing the certified 
circuit court docket sheet. Defendant's arguments regarding 
alleged defects of the retail theft plea are irrelevant to the 
probation revocation. 
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POINT II 
Defendant failed to provide the trial court, and 
consequently has failed to provide this Court, with a complete 
record of the misdemeanor plea necessary to resolve the two 
issues she raises on appeal. By failing to provide the lower 
court, and this Court, with a complete record regarding those 
issues, defendant's claims are merely speculative and she is 
prevented from adjudicating them on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE PROBATION REVOCATION WAS BASED ON THE ACT 
OF VIOLATING THE LAW, NOT THE GUILTY PLEA 
WHICH RESULTED FROM THE ACT; THEREFORE, 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO SHOW HOW ANY ALLEGED 
DEFECT IN THE PLEA WOULD AFFECT THE 
REVOCATION. 
The original affidavit supporting the State's Motion for 
Order to Show Cause stated the revocation was based on 
defendant's plea of guilty to a charge of retail theft. The 
trial court, in agreement with the prosecutor and defense 
counsel, changed the wording from "pled guilty" to "committed the 
offense of retail theft" (R. 69). This wording change ensured 
that the record actually reflected the basis for revocation as 
the act of retail theft, not the plea of guilty. 
As the revocation was based on the act of retail theft, the 
State needed to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that 
defendant committed the violation. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 
270, 278 (Utah App. 1990) cert, denied (Dec. 26, 1990). A 
certified copy of a court record is sufficient to establish a 
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prior conviction. State v. Diaz, 859 P.2d 19, 21 (Utah App. 
1993). The docket sheet here was certified (See State's Exhibit 
S-l) . 
Defendant's claims that the trial court improperly revoked 
her probation on the basis of the plea are claims without merit. 
The plea was not the basis for the revocation; the revocation was 
based on the commission of the theft. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT'S FAILURE TO PROVIDE THE TRIAL 
COURT, AND THEREFORE, THIS COURT WITH A 
COMPLETE RECORD OF THE MISDEMEANOR HEARING 
RENDERS HER CLAIMS WHOLLY SPECULATIVE AND 
PRECLUDES REVIEW. 
If the Court determines the basis for probation revocation 
was defendart-'s charge of retail theft charge, the Court will be 
precluded from reviewing defendant's plea for alleged 
constitutional violations due to defendant's failure to provide a 
complete record to the lower court, and therefore, this Court. 
Defendant claims that her waiver of counsel was not a 
knowing and voluntary waiver. She also claims that her plea was 
not taken in accordance with the procedures set forth in Utah R. 
Crim. P. 11, as she was not informed that by pleading guilty her 
probation on the felony conviction could be revoked. 
However, defendant has failed to provide this Court, as she 
failed to provide the trial court, with a record or transcript of 
the plea hearing. It is impossible for this Court to determine 
if defendant's waiver or plea were defective without knowing what 
occurred in the lower court. It is as likely as not that 
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defendant made a knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel and was 
fully informed of her constitutional rights and the ramifications 
of her plea. However, due to defendant's failure to provide an 
adequate record to either court there is no way to determine that 
at this stage of the appeal. Such a failure to provide necessary 
documentation renders defendant's claims wholly speculative and 
precludes review. Interiors Contracting Inc. v. Navalco, 648 
P.2d 1382, 1391 (Utah 1982) ("Failure to adduce evidence on a 
claim at issue constitutes a waiver of the claim). 
Although defendant cites many case in her brief that 
allegedly support her claims, the cases deal are not on point. 
The majority of the cases involve a clear violation, set forth 
from the record, of the right to counsel. The remainder involve 
factual situations where there was a record produced but the 
record was silent as to the waiver of counsel. It is not 
possible to apply those cases to this case as the lack of an 
adequate record prevents further analysis of the legality of the 
waiver of counsel and a valid plea. 
Even if the Court decides to reach the issue of a valid 
waiver and plea, the State asserts that an uncounseled plea, even 
if obtained in violation of the Sixth Amendment, can still be 
used to revoke probationary status of another offense if the plea 
itself did not result in imprisonment. State v. Sanchez, 612 
P.2d 1332, 1333 (N.M. App. 1980), cert, denied 615 P.2d 992 (N.M. 
1980) . 
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The State further asserts that there is no case law, that 
the State could discover, which supports defendant's theory at a 
plea is not valid unless a defendant is fully informed of the 
possible ramifications of the plea on a previously imposed 
probation. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's probation revocation was based on the act of 
retail theft, a violation of the law; it was not based on the act 
of pleading guilty to the charges of retail theft. As the 
revocation was based on the act and not the plea, defendant's 
allegations that her plea was in violation of her constitutional 
rights has no bearing on the validity of revocation. 
Defendant has failed to provide the trial court, or this 
Court, with a complete record from which to determine the 
legality of the waiver of counsel or the validity of the guilty 
plea. In order to determine if defendant's plea was without a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of counsel or if the plea violated 
state procedural guidelines, the trial court, and therefore, this 
Court must review a transcript or record of the proceeding. 
Defendant has failed to provide either one. Lack of such crucial 
information prevents the Court from adjudicating defendant's 
claims as they are purely speculative. For these reasons the 
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State respectfully requests that the trial court's order revoking 
defendant's probation be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _22l~~of MaY/ 1994. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
JIE GEORGE 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the 
foregoing motion was mailed, First-Class postage prepaid, to 
Ronald S. Fujino and Lynn R. Brown, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc. 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake City, Utah, 
84111, Attorneys for Appellant, this^.P day of May, 1994. 
r^&z- •> 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
77-17-3 UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 17 
THE TRIAL 
77-17-3. Discharge for insufficient evidence. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS the close of the state's case, the defendant did 
Motion for directed verdict n ° l W a 'V e t h e c , a i m b y f a i , i nB t o t a k e «x«'l>-
— Waiver of claim. t l o n w h e n t h e c o u r t t o o k l h e natter under ad-
visement, and the error was not harmless since 
Motion for directed verdict the state had not established a prima facie case 
— Waiver of claim. against the defendant and that error and 
After the trial court erred by not ruling on o t h e r s affected the jury's decision. State v. 
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict at E m m e t t , 184 Utah Adv Rep. 34 (1992). 
CHAPTER 18 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section Section 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence - Pleas Termination, revocation, modi 
held in abeyance - Probation Ikation, or extension - Hear-
— Supervision -— Presentence ings. 
investigation - Standards - 77-18-2. Expungement and sealing of 
Confidentiality — Terms and records — Procedures 
conditions — Restitution — 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance 
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence in-
vestigation — Standards — Confidentiality — 
Terms and conditions — Restitution — Termina-
tion, revocation, modification, or extension — 
Hearings. 
(1) "Confidential" as used in this section means that the disclosure of the 
presentence investigation report, including any diagnostic evaluation report 
ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404, is limited to: 
(a) the court, prosecutor, and the defendant or his counsel for sentenc-
ing purposes only; 
(b) law enforcement agencies and other agencies approved by the De-
partment of Corrections in the supervision, confinement, and treatment 
of the offender; and 
(c) the Board of Pardons in its decision-making process 
(2) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction 
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance 
as provided in Sections 77-2a-l through 77-2a-4 and under the terms of the 
plea in abeyance agreement. 
(3) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction 
ol any crime or offense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution 
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THE JUDGMENT 77-18-1 
of sentence and place the defendant on probation. The court may place the 
defendant: 
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Cor-
rections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions; 
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a 
private organization; or 
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing 
court, 
(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of 
the department is with the Department of Corrections. 
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of 
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has 
continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(4) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and pre-
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de-
partment. These standards shall be based on: 
(i) the type of offense; 
(ii) the demand for services; 
(iii) the availability of agency resources; 
(iv) the public safety; and 
(v) other criteria established by the Department of Corrections to 
determine what level of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons on an annual basis for 
review and comment prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections. 
(c) The Judicial Council and department shall establish procedures to 
implement the supervision and investigation standards. 
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider 
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (a) and 
other criteria as they consider appropriate. 
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an 
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations 
subcommittee. 
(5) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department 
standards. 
(6) (a) (i) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of 
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a 
presentence investigation report from the Department of Corrections 
or information from other sources about the defendant. 
(ii) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific 
statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation 
from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of resti-
tution by the defendant. 
(iii) The contents of the presentence investigation report, includ-
ing any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Sec-
tion 76-3-404, are confidential and are not available except by court 
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dv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his 
own behalf, and present evidence, 
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact. 
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of 
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified, con-
tinued, or that the entire probation term commence anew. 
(iii) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the 
sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(12) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for willful 
and malicious injury for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 523, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of 
the Division of Mental Health for treatment at the Utah State Hospital as a 
condition of probation or stay of sentence, only after the superintendent of the 
Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the court that: 
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment al 
the state hospital; 
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and 
(c) that persons described in Subsection 62A-12-209(2)(g) are receiving 
priority for treatment over the defendants described in this subsection. 
(14) (a) The department shall make rules in accordance with Title 63, 
Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, regarding disclosure 
of presentence diagnostic evaluation and investigation reports to main-
tain confidentiality of the report. 
(b) Disclosure of a presentence investigation report, including any sup-
plemental diagnostic evaluation report, is exempt from the provisions oi 
Title 63, Chapter 2, Government Records Access and Management Act. 
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L. the first and second sentences of Subsection 
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch. (5)(b); added Subsections <5)(c) and (13); and 
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, $ 1; made several punctuation and stylistic 
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, 9 1; 1985, ch. changes throughout the section 
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, ft 1; 1987, ch. 114, The 1992 amendment, effective April 27, 
ft I; 1989, ch . 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, * 2; 1992, added "including the community service 
1991, ch. 66, ft 5; 1991, ch. 206, ft 6; 1992, ch. program provided in Section 78 11-20.7" to the 
14, ft 3; 1993, ch. 82, ft 7; 1993, ch. 220, ft 3. end of Subsection <6)<g). 
Amendment Notes . — The 1990 amend- The 1993 amendment by ch. 82, effective 
ment, effective April 23, 1990, added Subsec- May 3, 1993, added Subsection (2) and redesig 
U o n
 <H>- nated former Subsections (2) through (13) as 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 66, effective Subsections (3) through (14). 
April 29, 1991, in present Subsection (2)(a) The 1993 amendment by ch. 220, effective 
substituted "guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no May 3, 1993, added "and any other costs as 
contest" for "guilty or no contest" in the first sessed under Section 64-13-21" in present Sub 
sentence section (8), substituted "owes" for has" and "or 
The 1991 amendment by ch. 206, effective other assessed costs" for "owing" and added 
April 29, 1991, added present Subsection (1), "and other amounts outstanding" in present 
redesignating the following subsections accord- Subsection <9>(a)(ii), substituted "and oilier 
ingly, subdivided Subsections (2Kb), (3), (5)(a), amounts outstanding" for "orders" in present 
(7), (8>(a>, <9)(a), and (10), substituted "appro-
 % Subsection <9)<b), and made stylistic changes 
pnat ions subcommittee" for "appropriations This section is set out as reconciled by the 
committee" at the end of Subsection (3)(e); sub- Office of Legislative Research and General 
stituted the language beginning with "presen- Counsel. 
tence" and ending with "court order" for "re- Cross-References . — Voluntary commit 
port are confidential and not available except" ment to Division of Mental Health, § 62A-I2-
in Subsection (5)(a)(ui); inserted "evidence" in 228(3). 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Due process of law 
Extension of probation. 
Restitution 
Revocation of probation. 
-Nature of violation. 
— Notice of grounds. 
— Standard of proof. 
— Time for proceedings. 
-Wri t ten findings. 
Suspension of probation. 
Termination of probation period. 
Cited. 
Due p r o c e s s of law. 
Trial court did not jeopardize defendant's 
due process r ights by refusing to entertain his 
motion to continue sentencing to obtain a per-
sonal examination and evaluation by the treat-
ment facilities that had rejected him, because 
defendant had full and complete access to the 
presentence report and a diagnostic evaluation 
for almost two weeks before the hearing and 
had the opportunity to contest effectively any 
perceived factual inaccuracies. State v. Rhodes, 
818 P.2d 1048 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). 
E x t e n s i o n of probation. 
Proceedings for extension of probation com-
menced prior to termination of the original 
term gave the court jurisdiction over the defen-
dant until conclusion of those proceedings. 
State v Rawlmgs, 183 Utah Adv. Rep. 75 (Ct. 
App. 1992). 
Restitution. 
The s ta te can enforce restitution as both a 
condition of probation pursuant to Subsection 
(8), and as a separate and independant compo-
nent of the court's judgment and the defen-
dant 's original sentence under ftft 76-3-201(3), 
(5), and 76-3 201.1(1). The expiration of the 
court's jurisdiction to require payment of resti-
tution as a condition of probation, therefore, 
does not diminish the enforceability of restitu-
tion as an independent component of the sen-
tence decreed in the judgment. State v. Dickey, 
199 Utah Adv. Rep. 21 (Ct. App 1992). 
Restitution is part of the court's judgment 
and is dependent upon a finding of guilt. State 
v Chns tensen , 201 Utah Adv. Rep. 68 (Ct. 
App. 1992) 
R e v o c a t i o n of p r o b a t i o n . 
— N a t u r e of v io la t ion . 
To support revocation of probation for the 
violation of a condition of probation not involv-
ing the payment of money, the violation must 
be willful or, if not willful, must presently 
threaten the safety of society. State v. Hodges, 
798 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
— Not ice of g r o u n d s . 
Notice of probation revocation proceedings 
within the probation period is required in order 
to revoke a defendant's probation. Smith v. 
Cook, 803 P 2 d 788 (Utah 1990). 
—Standard of proof. 
The standard to be used in proving a viola-
tion of a condition of probation is a preponder-
ance of the evidence. State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 
270 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
—Time for proceedings . 
This section requires only tha t revocation 
proceedings be initiated within the probation 
period and not tha t the proceeding also be com-
pleted by the end of the probation period. State 
v. Kahl, 814 P 2d 1151 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(decided under 1980 version, before addition of 
present Subsection (10)(a>). 
State was not responsible for unreasonable 
delay in completing revocation proceedings 
when defendant fled the jurisdiction before his 
probation revocation proceeding could be com-
pleted. State v Kahl, 814 P 2 d 1151 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991) (decided under 1980 version, before 
addition of present Subsection (10)(a)). 
—Written findings. 
Written findings of fact are not necessary in 
every judicial probation revocation. A complete 
trial court record and transcript can suffice in 
lieu of written findings. However, the record 
and transcript must reveal the evidence relied 
on and the reasons for revoking probation. 
State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). 
Suspens ion of probation. 
Suspension of the period of probation during 
the time a person is in confinement await ing a 
revocation hearing does not place tha t person 
in a "state of perpetual limbo," because 
whether the time spent in confinement will 
constitute service of probation is contingent on 
the final determination of the revocation pro-
ceedings. State v. Jameson, 800 P.2d 798 (Utah 
1990). 
Termination of probation period. 
The 1984 amendment, which limited the 
time a person can be placed on probation to 18 
months, pursuant to § 68-3-3 should not apply 
retroactively. Smith v. Cook, 803 P 2d 788 
(Utah 1990). 
Probation may not be retroactively revoked 
no matter how clear it subsequently appears 
that probation requirements were not followed, 
if no enforcement action is taken prior to the 
elapse of the term of probation. State v. Moya, 
815 P.2d 1312 (Utah Ct App. 1991). 
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order for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial 
Council or for use by the Department of Corrections. 
(b) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evi-
dence, or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to 
present concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or 
information shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence 
of the defendant. 
(c) After the sentencing, the presentence investigation report, includ-
ing any diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 
76-3-404, and all copies of the presentence investigation report, become 
the property of the Department of Corrections and are for internal use of 
the department only. 
(7) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following: 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
(f) serve a term of home confinement; 
(g) participate in community service restitution programs, including 
the community service program provided in Section 78-11-20.7; 
(h) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment services; 
(i) make restitution i,i reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3-201(3) and (4); and 
(j) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers appro-
priate. 
(8) (a) The Department of Corrections is responsible, upon order of the 
court, tor the collection of fines, restitution, and any other costs assessed 
under Section 64-13-21 during the probation period in cases for which the 
court orders supervised probation by the department. 
(b) The prosecutor shall provide notice of the restitution order to the 
clerk of the court. 
(c) The clerk shall place the order on the civil docket and shall provide 
notice of the order to the parties. 
(d) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the 
: Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
' (9) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the 
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in 
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B 
or C misdemeanors or infractions. 
(ii) If the defendant, upon expiration or termination of the proba-
tion period, owes outstanding fines, restitution, or other assessed 
costs, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the 
defendant on bench probation or place the defendant on bench proba-
tion for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of fines, restitu-
tion, and other amounts outstanding. 
dii) Upon motion of the prosecutor or victim, or upon its own mo-
tion, the court may require the defendant to show cause why his 
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failure to pay should not be treated as contempt of court or why the 
suspended jail or prison term should not be imposed, 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing in advance in all cases when termi-
nation of supervised probation will occur by law. The notification shall 
include a probation progress report and complete report of details on 
outstanding fines, restitution, and other amounts outstanding. 
(10) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after 
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hear-
ing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the 
total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hear-
ing to revoke the probation. 
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision 
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time 
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated 
at the hearing, 
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a 
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and condi-
tions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or 
warrant by the court. 
(11) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in 
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation. 
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court 
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts 
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the 
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit estab-
lishes probable cause to.believe that revocation, modification, or ex-
tension of probation is justified. 
(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to 
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the 
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be 
revoked, modified, or extended. 
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the 
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days 
prior to the hearing. 
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. 
(iii) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right 
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel 
appointed for him if he is indigent. 
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present 
evidence. 
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allega-
tions of the affidavit. 
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. 
(iii) The persons who have given adverse information on which the 
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to ques-
tioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise 
orders. 
221 
ADDENDUM B 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
T l\ \ >4 > 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT < HE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
-VS-
KATHERINE H. CAPELLAN, 
DEFENDANT. 
^0-1900365 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 7TH DAY 
OF JUNE, 199 3, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:27 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, IN AND FOR SALT 
LAKE C'OUN'i'Y, STATE' OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BTING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH. 
FILED BISTfi!C7 C8URT 
Third Judicial Otstrict 
JSy,-
NOV 2 9 1993 
Deputy 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. r ~. r - ' •• f I «J *J -J '" 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
FOR THE STATE: JAMES COPE 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
231 EAST 400 SOUTH 
THIRD FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
FOR THE DEFENDANT: BROOKE WELLS 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEF. ASSOC. 
424 EAST 500 SOUTH 
SUITE #300 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
* * * 
ion 
DISCUSSION BETWEEN COURT AND COUNSEL PAGE 3 
* * * 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. C0CC7 2 
£ R 0 C E E D I N G S 
JUDGE YOUNG: THIS IS THE TIME SET TO CONSIDER 
THE MATTER OF STATE VERSUS KATHERINE H. CAPELLEN. THE CASE 
NUMBER IS 90-1900365. 
THE RECORD WILL SHOW MS. CAPELLEN IS PRESENT 
BEFORE THE COURT. 
THIS MATTER IS ON THE CALENDAR FOR AN ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE. HAVE YOU HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO REVIEW THE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE? 
MS. WELLS: YES, YOUR HONOR, I HAVE. I WOULD 
LIKE THE RECORD TO REFLECT THAT THIS IS MR. BROWN'S CASE 
AND THAT HE WILL BE HANDLING IT AFTER TODAY. HE'S NOT IN 
THE OFFICE TODAY. 
WE HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY TO GO OVER THAT. I 
WOULD ADVISE MS. CAPELLEN TO DENY THESE ALLEGATIONS AND ASK 
THAT THEY BE SET OVER FOR A HEARING AT WHICH TIME MR. BROWN 
WOULD BE PRESENT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. MS. CAPELLEN, I'M GOING 
TO ASK YOU WHETHER YOU ADMIT OR DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE 
AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
MR. COPE, DO YOU HAVE A QUESTION FIRST? 
MR. COPE: NO, YOUR HONOR. I HAVE A REQUEST OF 
THE COURT. AS THE COURT CAN SEE THE ALLEGATIONS INVOLVED, 
ALLEGATIONS THAT SHE PLED GUILTY TO THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL 
T COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
THEFT ON THE LAST ONE. AND I BELIEVE THIS IS SIMPLY AN 
ERROR. I DON'T BELIEVE THAT A PERSON SHOULD BE FOUND IN 
CONTEMPT OF COURT OR ANYTHING LIKE THAT FOR HAVING PLED 
GUILTY TO AN OFFENSE AND WE'D LIKE THE COURT TO, BY INTER-
LINEATION, AMEND THESE ALLEGATIONS TO REFLECT WHAT WE'RE 
REALLY CONCERNED WITH, WHICH IS THAT SHE COMMITTED THOSE 
OFFENSES, NOT THAT SHE PLED GUILTY TO THEM. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO IF WE INTERLINEATE ON NO. 1, "BY 
HAVING COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL THEFT," AND STRIKE 
THE WORDS "PLED GUILTY TO," ARE YOU COMFORTABLE WITH THAT? 
MR. COPE: YES, YOUR HONOR. 
MS. WELLS: NO OBJECTION. 
MR. COPE: THE SAME ON THE SECOND ONE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MS. CAPELLEN, I WILL ASK YOU WHETH-
ER YOU ADMIT OR DENY THE ALLEGATIONS IN THIS AMENDED AFFI-
DAVIT. 
MS. CAPELLAN: I DENY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: FIRST IT IS ALLEGED THAT YOU VIO-
LATED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF YOUR PROBATION BY HAVING 
COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL THEFT, A CLASS B MISDEMEAN-
OR, ON OR ABOUT APRIL 23RD, 1993, IN DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, 
WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF CONDITION NUMBER FIVE. 
DO YOU ADMIT OR DENY THAT? 
MS. CAPELLAN: I DENY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: NUMBER 2, THAT YOU VIOLATED YOUR 
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PROBATION AGAIN BY HAVING COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL 
THEFT, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR, ON OR ABOUT MAY 17TH, 1993, 
IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF CONDI-
TION NUMBER FIVE. 
DO YOU ADMIT OR DENY TH.M 
MS. CAPELLAN: DENY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: NUMBER 3, THAT YOU VIOLATED YOUR 
PROBATION AGAIN BY HAVING COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL 
THEFT, ON OR ABOUT MAY 11TH, 1993, IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
UTAH, WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF CONDITION NUMBER FIVE. 
DO YOU ADMIT OR DENY THAT? 
MS. CAPELLAN: DENY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: HAVING DENIED EACH YOU'RE ENTITLED 
TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
MS. WELLS: YOUR HONOR-
JUDGE YOUNG: YES, MS. WELLS? 
MS. WELLS: I' r JNDERSTANDING THAT THE STATE 
BELIEVES THAT SHE HAS ENTERED PLEAS OF GUILTY IN AT LEAST 
ONE OF THESE. SHE INDICATES ANOTHER WAS DISMISSED. THE 
EVIDENTIARY HEARING, I BELIEVE, WOULD MERELY NECESSITATE 
THE MINUTE ENTRIES OR THE JUDGMENTS SHOWING WHICH MATTERS 
HAVE BEEN RESOLVED. 
JUDGE YOUNG: SO YOU WOULD ANTICIPATE NEEDING NO 
WITNESSES IN— 
MS. WELLS': THAT'S CORRECT. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: —IN THOSE CASES. ALL RIGHT. WITH 
THAT UNDERSTANDING, MR. COPE, WILL YOU BE HANDLING THIS 
CASE OR WILL IT JUST BE ASSIGNED AS IS ROUTINE? 
MR. COPE: WHOEVER HAS THE CALENDAR THAT DAY, 
YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. WE WILL CONTINUE THIS THEN 
FOR TWO WEEKS, TO THE 21ST, FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING. 
LET'S SEE, SHE'S IN CUSTODY. WE COULD PROBABLY DO IT LATER 
THIS WEEK IF YOU WISH. 
MS. WELLS: MR. BROWN'S GOING TO BE GONE THIS 
WEEK, I BELIEVE, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I'M IN SUMMIT THE NEXT WEEK. 
MS. WELLS: SHE IS DOING AT LEAST A SIX-MONTH 
JAIL SENTENCE ON ONE OF THESE MATTERS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. 
MS. WELLS: SO THAT WOULD BE FINE. THE 21ST IS 
FINE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS SHE IN SALT LAKE COUNTY JAIL? 
MS. CAPELLAN: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THIS MATTER THEN WILL 
BE SET FOR THE 21ST OF JUNE AT 8:30 AND IT WILL BE SET FOR 
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AT THAT TIME. AND I WOULD ANTICI-
PATE MR. BROWN TO BE HANDLING THIS AND WILL BE PREPARED TO 
RESOLVE THE CASE. 
MR. COPE: YOUR HONOR, IF THE DEFENDANT WISHES 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R.
 rrn-|. 
1
 TO HAVE WITNESSES CALLED WE WOULD ANTICIPATE THAT THEY'D 
2
 I LET US KNOW ABOUT THAT FIVE DAYS IN ADVANCE. 
MS. WELLS: J DON'T ANT1.1PATL 1HL NECESSITY FOR 
4
 | THAT BUT I'LL TALK TO MR. BROWN ABOUT IT. 
5
 l JUDGE YOUNG ALL RIGHT. 
MS. WELLS: THANK Y ill 1UDGE. 
7
 | JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, EACH. COURT'S IN RE-
8
 I CESS. 
9
 | (WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED) 
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EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. C D C T 2 
C.E.RT.IFICA.TE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
EILEEN JH. AMBROSE,"' C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. C0C73 8 
ADDENDUM C 
^3 ^ - / rt\ ^ H \ 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
25 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF, 
KATHERINE H. CAPELLAN, 
DEFENDANT. 
) 
(^c^c^tt. 
) CRIMINAL NO. CR-90-1900365 
) EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
) 
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BE IT REMEMBERED THAT ON MONDAY, THE 21ST DAY 
OF JUNE, 19:-, COMMENCING AT THE HOUR OF 9:17 O'CLOCK 
A.M., THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER CAME ON FOR HEARING IN THE 
COURTROOM OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL, M STRICT, IN ATiP FOP SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH; SAID CAUSE BEING HELD BY THE 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, JUDGE IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, STATL OF UTAH. 
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FOR THE DEFENDANT: 
PAUL PARKER 
DEPUTY COUNTY ATTORNEY 
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LYNN BROWN 
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E E O C E i e i N G S 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE NEXT MATTER TO BE CONSIDERED IS 
THE MATTER OF STATE VERSUS KATHERINE CAPELLAN. THE CASE 
NUMBER IS 90-1900365. 
THE RECORD WILL SHOW MS. CAPELLAN IS PRESENT 
BEFORE THE COURT. THIS IS AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING REGARDING 
THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. 
MR. BROWN, WHAT'S YOUR POSITION? 
MR. BROWN: I GUESS SHE DENIED THE ALLEGATIONS 
LAST WEEK WHEN I WASN'T HERE. I THINK THE PROBATION DE-
PARTMENT HAS SOME DOCUMENTATION TO PRESENT TO THE COURT. 
IT DOESN'T REALLY CORRESPOND WITH THE ALLEGATIONS IN THE 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE BUT— 
JUDGE YOUNG: ARE YOU AWARE THAT WE HAVE INTER-
15
 I LINEATED AMENDMENTS TO THAT? LET ME JUST READ IT TO YOU. 
16 
17 
THE AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF THE ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE HAS 
BEEN INTERLINEATED ON JULY [SIC] 7TH TO READ, "BY HAVING 
COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL THEFT, A CLASS B MISDEMEAN-
OR, ON OR ABOUT APRIL 23RD, 1993 IN DAVIS COUNTY, UTAH, 
WHICH IS IN VIOLATION OF CONDITION NUMBER 5 OF THE DEFEND-
ANT'S PROBATION AGREEMENT." TO THAT SHE DENIED. 
THE NEXT IS NUMBER TWO, "BY HAVING COMMITTED THE 
OFFENSE OF," DELETING THE WORDS "PLED GUILTY TO THE OFFENSE 
OF," "RETAIL THEFT, A CLASS A MISDEMEANOR ON OR ABOUT MAY 
17TH, 1993 IN SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, WHICH IS IN VIOLATION 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. DOC 77 
OF CONDITION NUMBER 5." 
AND THEN NUMBER THREE, "BY HAVING COMMITTED THE 
OFFENSE OF"—IT'S ACTUALLY EACH—"BY HAVING COMMITTED THE 
OFFENSE OF RETAIL THEFT, ON OR ABOUT MAY 11TH, 1993 IN SALT 
LAKE COUNTY, UTAH." 
MR. BROWN: NO, I DIDN'T SEE THOSE DATES THAT 
WERE—I WASN'T AWARE THE COURT AMENDED THOSE TO SAY "COM-
MITTED THE OFFENSE." 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES. 
MR. BROWN: I DON'T— 
JUDGE YOUNG: NOT A MAJOR, MATERIAL DIFFERENCE 
THERE. 
THIS IS SET FOR THE EVIDENTIARY HEARING. YOU MAY 
PROCEED, MR. PARKER. 
MR. PARKER: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. STATE WOULD 
CALL TAMRA SAHDOAN. 
JUDGE YOUNG: COME FORWARD, PLEASE, MS. SHADOAN. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. C0C75 5 
TAMRA SHADOAN. 
CALLED AS A WITNESS BY AND ON BEHALF OF THE PLAINTIFF, 
HAVING BEEN FIRST DULY SWORN, WAS EXAMINED AND TESTIFIED AS 
FOLLOWS: 
THE CLERK: PLEASE BE SEATED AND STATE YOUR NAME 
AND SPELL IT. 
THE WITNESS: TAMRA SHADOAN. S-H-A-D-O-A-N. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q WHERE ARE YOU EMPLOYED, MA'AM? 
A UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS. 
Q WHAT IS YOUR POSITION THERE? 
A I AM A PROBATION OFFICER. 
Q WHICH MEANS? 
A I SUPERVISE PERSONS PLACED ON PROBATION BY 
THE DISTRICT AND CIRCUIT COURTS. 
Q DO YOU HAVE ANY RESPONSIBILITIES CONCERNING 
THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE? 
A YES. I AM HER PROBATION OFFICER AND HAVE 
BEEN FOR THE LAST 12 MONTHS. 
Q LET ME HAND YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED 
STATE'S EXHIBIT 1. WHAT IS THAT? 
A IT'S A COURT DOCKET FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
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COURT. 
COURT? 
WHO OBTAINED THAT FROM THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
A I DID. 
Q DOES THAT APPEAR IN THE SAME CONDITION AS 
WHEN YOU OBTAINED IT? 
A YES. 
Q DID IT HAVE A CERTIFICATION ON IT WHEN YOU 
OBTAINED IT? 
A YES. 
Q DOES THAT APPEAR MODIFIED BETWEEN WHEN YOU 
OBTAINED IT AND TODAY? 
A NO. 
MR. PARKER: YOUR HONOR, WE MOVE FOR STATE'S 
EXHIBIT NO. 1, WHICH IS A CERTIFIED COPY OF THE COURT 
DOCKET. 
17
 | JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECTION, MR. BROWN? 
18
 ' MR. BROWN: COULD I ASK A QUESTION? 
JUDGE YOUNG: YES, YOU MAY. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION. 
BY MR. BROWN: 
Q THIS IS FROM THE CERTIFIED COURT DOCUMENT 
HAVING TO DO WITH WHICH ALLEGATION, MS. SHADOAN? IS THAT 
HAVING TO DO WITH ALLEGATION NUMBER 3? 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 000 SO 
IT'D ] 
BY MR 
STATE 
A 
BE NUMBER 
IT'S NUMBER 2, I BELIEVE. LET ME CHECK. i 
3 . j 
MR. BROWN: OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECTION, MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: NO. 
JUDGE 
. PARKER: 
Q 
•S EXHIBIT 
A 
FROM LAYTON. 
TO ME 
TODAY 
Q 
A 
FRIDAY. 
Q 
YOUNG: STATE'S 1 IS RECEIVED. 
(WHEREUPON, STATE'S EXHIBIT 
NO. 1 WAS OFFERED AND RE-
CEIVED INTO EVIDENCE). 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONT'D!. 
LET ME HAND YOU WHAT HAS BEEN MARKED AS 
NUMBER 2. AND WHAT IS IT? 
THIS IS A COPY OF THE CIRCUIT COURT DOCKET 
HOW DID YOU RECEIVE THAT? 
THE CLERK IN THE LAYTON COURT HAD FAXED IT 
DOES THAT APPEAR IN THE SAME CONDITION 
AS WHEN YOU RECEIVED IT? 
A 
Q 
THE INFORMATION 
A 
Q 
YES. 
WERE YOU ALSO TO INDEPENDENTLY CHECK ANY OF 
ON THAT DOCUMENT? 
ON THIS LAYTON DOCKET? 
YES. 
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A I HAD TO PREPARE A PRESENTENCE REPORT FROM 
A COURT ORDER. 
Q MY QUESTION WAS, DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNI-
TY TO CHECK ANY OF THE INFORMATION ON THAT DOCUMENT? 
A PER A PHONE CALL TO THE COURT CLERK. 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO? 
A AS--
Q WHAT INFORMATION DID YOU CHECK? 
A I CHECKED THE SENTENCE AND THE DISPOSITION 
OF THE SENTENCE. 
Q AND DOES THE INFORMATION YOU RECEIVED IN 
STATE'S EXHIBIT NUMBER TWO, WAS THAT THE SAME AS THE INFOR-
MATION YOU RECEIVED OVER THE PHONE? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. PARKER: LET ME HAVE THAT BACK. FOR THE 
RECORD I'M SHOWING STATE'S EXHIBIT N!~ ' TWO TO THE DE-
FENSE COUNSEL. I WOULD ASK THE ADMISSION OF STATE'S 
EXHIBIT NUMBER TWO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ANY OBJECTION, MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: JUST A SECOND. LET ME SEE WHAT IT 
IS. 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
BY MR. BROWN; 
Q ON EXHIBIT NUMBER TWO, THAT HAS TO DO WITH 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 000 82 
THE ALLEGATION NUMBER ONE; IS THAT CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND YOU ALLEGE IN YOUR AFFIDAVIT THAT 
ALLEGATION NUMBER ONE OCCURRED ON APRIL THE 23RD, 1993; IS 
THAT CORRECT? 
A WELL, ORIGINALLY I HAD ALLEGED THAT THE 
DEFENDANT PLEAD GUILTY ON OR ABOUT APRIL 25TH. 
Q THE AMENDED ALLEGATION INDICATES SHE COM-
MITTED THE OFFENSE ON APRIL THE 23RD, 1993. 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
Q AND THIS INFORMATION, OR THIS EXHIBIT, 
INDICATES—THAT DOES NOT SUPPORT YOUR ALLEGATION THAT SHE 
COMMITTED THE OFFENSE ON APRIL THE 23RD, 1993; IS THAT 
CORRECT? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. THE DATE ON THAT IS, I 
BELIEVE, OCTOBER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: LET HER FINISH HER ANSWER. 
Q BY MR. BROWN: THE DATE IS OCTOBER THAT 
IT'S TALKING ABOUT ON THIS; IS THAT TRUE? 
A THAT'S CORRECT. 
MR. BROWN: I DON'T THINK IT IS MATERIAL THEN, 
THIS EXHIBIT, YOUR HONOR. THE ALLEGATION'S APRIL THE 23RD 
AND THIS IS TALKING ABOUT SOMETHING THAT OCCURRED IN OCTO-
BER OF '92. I THINK IT'S—IT DON'T THINK IT'S ADMISSIBLE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MR. PARKER, IS THE DISTINCTION THE 
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DATE—OR THE DATE OF THE ALLEGED OFFENSE? 
MR. PARKER: IT IS, YOUR HONOR. THE ALLEGATIONS 
THAT WE HAVE ALLEGED ON COUNT NUMBER ONE STATES THAT THE 
DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE ON APRIL THE 23RD, 1993. 
THE DOCUMENT AND THE RETAIL THEFT THAT WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO 
SHOW INDICATES A VIOLATION DATE OF OCTOBER THE 25TH, 1992 
SO THAT IS A BIG DIFFERENCE ON THE DATE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT IS THE DATE OF THE OFFENSE. 
MR. PARKER: THAT IS CORRECT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU WITHDRAW THE EXHIBIT? IS 
THAT WHAT YOU'RE SAYING? 
MR. PARKER: I WOULD, YOUR HONOR. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONT'D^. 
BY MR. PARKER: 
Q DID YOU HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO DO ANY OTHER 
INVESTIGATION CONCERNING ALLEGATION NUMBER TWO IN THIS 
CASE? 
A YES/ 
Q WHAT DID YOU DO? 
A THE MURRAY COURT, I SPOKE WITH THE COURT 
CLERK THERE. SHE GAVE ME THE DISPOSITION OF THE SENTENCE 
OVER THE PHONE AND WAS TO FORWARD THAT INFORMATION TO ME 
FRIDAY, WHICH SHE DID NOT. HOWEVER, LOOKING IN THE COURT 
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DOCKETS WHICH WE USE FOR OUR CIRCUIT COURT CASES I HAVE 
WRITTEN DOWN THE DISPOSITION ON THAT DATE. 
Q YOU LOOKED AT WHAT DOCUMENTS? 
A IN THE CIRCUIT COURT YOU CAN GO INTO THE 
CIRCUIT COURT SCREENS OVER AT OUR OFFICE FOR THE DISPOSI-
TIONS FROM THE COURT. 
MR. BROWN: YOUR HONOR, I OBJECT TO THAT PROCE-
DURE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THE OBJECTION IS SUSTAINED. 
MR. PARKER: ALL RIGHT. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS. 
JUDGE YOUNG: CROSS-EXAMINATION, MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: NO CROSS-EXAMINATION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU, MS. SHADOAN. YOU MAY 
STEP DOWN. 
DO YOU HAVE ANY FURTHER WITNESSES, MR. PARKER? 
MR. PARKER: NO, YOUR HONOR. AND, OBVIOUSLY, 
WE'VE ONLY PROVIDED EVIDENCE ON ALLEGATION NUMBER THREE 
AND, THEREFORE, WE'D MOVE TO DISMISS COUNT NUMBER ONE AND 
TWO AND PROCEED ON COUNT NUMBER THREE. WE NOTE THERE IS A 
DIFFERENCE ON THE DATE IN THE COURT RECORD. THE COURT 
RECORD INDICATED A VIOLATION DATE OF MAY THE 10TH, 1993. 
THE ALLEGATION SAYS MAY THE 11TH. WHAT WE'D DO IS ASK TO 
AMEND THAT BY INTERLINEATION. WE HAVE ALREADY ALLEGED "ON 
OR ABOUT MAY 10TH.M I THINK THAT IS ADEQUATE TO PROVIDE 
THE DEFENDANT NOTICE AND ALLOW FOR US TO AMEND TO CONFORM 
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WITH THE EVIDENCE AND THAT WOULD MAKE IT MAY THE 10TH. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO THAT, 
MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: I HAVE NO OBJECTION TO THAT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. I'VE AMENDED IT BY 
INTERLINEATION ON THE AFFIDAVIT. 
YOU HAVE NO FURTHER WITNESSES THEN, MR. PARKER? 
MR. PARKER: NONE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THANK YOU. 
MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: I HAVE NO WITNESSES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: DO YOU WISH TO ARGUE IT? 
MR. BROWN: WITH REGARD TO ALLEGATION NUMBER 
THREE THEY'VE ALLEGED THAT SHE COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF 
RETAIL THEFT AND THERE'S BEEN NO PROOF THAT SHE COMMITTED 
ANY OFFENSE OF RETAIL THEFT. WHEN YOU WANT TO BRING EVI-
DENCE WITH RESPECT TO THAT YOU HAVE TO PUT ON WITNESSES 
THAT PROVE THAT SHE STOLE SOMETHING ON SUCH AND SUCH A 
DATE. THERE'S NO SUCH PROOF HERE TODAY. I MEAN— 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, I HAVE A HARD TIME UNDER-
STANDING WHAT THE DIFFICULTY IS WHEN THEY BRING—THEY DON'T 
HAVE TO PROVE THE UNDERLYING OFFENSE IF SHE PLEAD GUILTY. 
AND I SEE ON MAY 28TH, '93 BEFORE JUDGE FUCHS, CONSISTENT 
WITH HIS DOCKET, THAT SHE ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA TO THIS 
OFFENSE, THAT HE SENTENCED HER TO FIVE DAYS IN JAIL, AND 
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CLOSED THE CASE. 
MR. BROWN: I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT THE COURT 
APPARENTLY FELT IT APPROPRIATE LAST TIME HERE TO AMEND IT 
TO SHOW THAT SHE HAD COMMITTED THE OFFENSE ON THE OTHER TWO 
ALLEGATIONS RATHER THAN THAT SHE ENTERED A GUILTY PLEA TO 
THOSE TWO ALLEGATIONS. IF IT IS APPROPRIATE TO PUT IN 
THEIR AFFIDAVIT THAT SHE PLED GUILTY TO THOSE TWO OFFENSES 
THEN I GUESS IT IS APPROPRIATE TO PROCEED THAT WAY. BUT 
THEY HAVEN'T ALLEGED IN THEIR AFFIDAVIT THAT SHE PLEAD 
GUILTY TO THOSE TWO OFFENSES. THEY HAVE ALLEGED IN THEIR 
AFFIDAVIT, AND THEY'VE ALLEGED THE OTHER TWO TO CONFORM TO 
THAT, THAT SHE COMMITTED THOSE TWO OFFENSES. SO— 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, THERE CAN BE NO, UNLESS YOU 
SHOW ANY KIND OF EVIDENCE IN THIS PROCEEDING, THAT THEY 
HAVE THE WRONG PERSON, THERE CAN BE NO DISPUTE OF THE 
VALIDITY OF THEIR ALLEGATION NUMBER THREE. THE DATE MAY 
11TH THAT THEY BEGAN WITH IS THE DATE THE CASE WAS FILED SO 
THE OFFENSE OCCURRED THE DAY BEFORE. AND IF YOU LOOK AT 
THE DOCKET, WHICH I HAVE IN FRONT OF ME, IT SAYS ON MAY 
11TH THE CASE WAS FILED, SHE WAS ARRAIGNED ON MAY 18TH, AND 
THEN IT GOES THROUGH THE PROCEDURES. SHE THEN APPEARED 
BEFORE PATRICK CASEY ON MAY 21ST AND SO ON AND THEN ENTERED 
HER PLEA BEFORE JUDGE FUCHS ON MAY 28TH. NOW, TO ME, I'M 
HAVING A HARD TIME UNDERSTANDING HOW, NUMBER ONE, ALLEGA-
TION NUMBER THREE OF THE AFFIDAVIT WOULD NOT GIVE HER CLEAR 
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NOTICE AND, NUMBER TWO, HOW THIS WOULD NOT VERIFY THE FACT 
THAT SHE DID, INDEED, PLEAD GUILTY. AND I DON'T THINK I 
NEED TO HAVE THEM PROVE THE UNDERLYING FACTS OF THE OFFENSE 
IF SHE PLEAD GUILTY. 
5
 I MR. BROWN: I DO, FOR THIS REASON, YOUR HONOR. 
6
 I THERE'S NO INDICATION IN THE RECORD THAT THE COURT HAS THAT 
SHE ENTERED THOSE PLEAS REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY, FULLY 
ADVISED BY AN ATTORNEY THAT THE FACT THAT IF SHE ENTERED A 
GUILTY PLEA TO THOSE OFFENSES THAT THEY COULD BE USED 
AGAINST HER IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDING ON AN ORDER TO SHOW 
CAUSE, SUCH AS WE HAVE HERE. SHE WAS NOT REPRESENTED BY AN 
12
 | ATTORNEY, SHE WAS NOT FULLY INFORMED ON THE RECORD AS TO 
13 i
 T H £ T 0 T A L RAMIFICATIONS OF HER GUILTY PLEA TO THAT, TO THE 
14
 | EFFECT THAT UPON ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA TO THAT CHARGE IN 
THE CIRCUIT COURT, THAT SHE COULD BE VIOLATED IN THE DIS-
TRICT COURT AS A RESULT OF THAT. AND I THINK THERE'S CASE 
LAW TO THE AFFECT THAT IN ORDER TO USE THOSE CHARGES 
AGAINST HER IN THE CIRCUIT COURT THEY HAVE TO ESTABLISH NOT 
ONLY DID SHE ENTER A GUILTY PLEA TO THOSE CHARGES, THAT SHE 
DID IT KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY, THAT SHE WAS REPRESENTED 
BY AN ATTORNEY, AND THAT SHE WAS FULLY INFORMED AT THAT 
TIME THAT THOSE PLEAS OF GUILTY COULD BE USED AGAINST HER 
IN THE SUBSEQUENT PROCEEDINGS. AND THAT WAS NOT DONE. AND 
THAT'S THE BASIS FOR MAY OBJECTION HERE TODAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, SHE WAS ON PROBATION AND SHE 
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CLEARLY KNEW FROM HER PROBATION AGREEMENT THAT SHE SHOULD 
NOT VIOLATE ANY LAW OF THE STATE, FEDERAL OR LOCAL GOVERN-
MENT, AND THAT'S A CONDITION OF HER PROBATION. HOW CAN YOU 
ALLEGE THAT SHE HAS TO BE TOLD BEFORE SHE ENTERS A PLEA TO 
ONE OF THOSE OFFENSES OF SOMETHING THAT SHE CLEARLY WOULD 
BE PRESUMED TO UNDERSTAND BY HAVING SIGNED A PROBATION 
AGREEMENT? 
MR. BROWN: I THINK THE CASE LAW WILL SUPPORT 
THAT, THAT SHE HAS TO BE INFORMED, THAT SHE HAS TO BE—WHEN 
YOU USE A CHARGE AGAINST SOMEBODY IN A SUBSEQUENT PROCEED-
ING I THINK THE CASE LAW INDICATES THAT THEY HAVE TO ESTAB-
LISH—FOR EXAMPLE, IF YOU'RE GOING TO USE SOMEBODY'S PRIOR 
CONVICTION AGAINST THEM IN A COURT PROCEEDINGS FOR IMPEACH-
MENT PURPOSES YOU HAVE TO ESTABLISH THAT THEY ENTERED A 
GUILTY PLEA ON THAT CHARGE KNOWINGLY AND VOLUNTARILY AND 
THAT THEY'RE FULLY REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY-
JUDGE YOUNG: I UNDERSTAND THAT, BUT THAT'S— 
MR. BROWN: —UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: THAT'S WHERE YOU'RE USING IT IN 
SUBSEQUENT TRIAL. 
MR. BROWN: BUT I THINK THE SAME PRINCIPLE WOULD 
APPLY HERE. THAT WOULD BE MY POSITION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: I SEE. 
MR. PARKER, DO YOU DESIRE TO BE HEARD ON THAT? 
MR. PARKER: I WOULD, YOUR HONOR. AND I'M 
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PERSONALLY AWARE OF NO CASE THAT APPLIES THAT PRINCIPLE 
THAT I REALLY THINK WE ARE AT THE CONTEXT THAT'S MOSTLY 
USED WHEN A LATER CRIME IS BEING ENHANCED BY A PRIOR CON-
VICTION. I'M NOT SURE IT APPLIES STRICTLY WHEN WE'RE DOING 
SUCH THINGS AS IMPEACHING WITNESSES OR WHERE WE'RE IN THE 
CONTEXT OF AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. I'VE NEVER HEARD ANY-
WHERE THAT AT THE TIME OF A PLEA OF GUILTY THAT THE COURT 
HAS TO ADVISE THAT PERSON THAT IT HAS SOME COLLATERAL 
RAMIFICATIONS, INCLUDING VIOLATING THAT PERSON'S PROBATION. 
BUT EVEN GETTING PAST THAT I THINK IN THIS CASE 
WE HAVE A CONTEXT WHERE THE RULES OF EVIDENCE DON'T STRICT-
LY APPLY AND IN THAT CONTEXT WE HAVE A DOCUMENT THAT SHOWS 
AN ADMISSION BY THE DEFENDANT IN THAT SHE PLEADED GUILTY TO 
THE OFFENSE. AND IF WE ARE TALKING ABOUT ESTABLISHING THE 
UNDERLYING ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE OF THEFT, WHEN THAT 
PERSON GOES IN AND MAKES THE ADMISSION IN COURT AND PLEADS 
GUILTY TO IT, I THINK THAT IS MORE THAN ENOUGH EVIDENCE BY 
ITSELF THAT THE COURT OUGHT TO REVOKE THE PROBATION OF THAT 
PERSON. 
SO I SUPPOSE WHAT I'M ARGUING IS THERE'S TWO 
REASONS THAT THIS IS ADMISSIBLE. ONE, IS BECAUSE IT IS A 
CERTIFIED COURT DOCUMENT AND THOSE CASE LAWS I DO NOT THINK 
ESTABLISH THAT WE HAVE TO BE ANY FURTHER IN AN ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE CONTEXT THAN PRESENTATION OF THE DOCUMENT. 
AND, SECONDLY, I BELIEVE THAT THAT STATEMENT, 
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BECAUSE IT IS ADMISSIBLE, ONE, AND BECAUSE OF THE ORDER TO 
SHOW CAUSE RULES AND THE CONTEXT, THAT THE STATEMENT IN 
THERE IS ENOUGH TO PROVE THE UNDERLYING ELEMENTS, AND THAT 
IS THAT SHE WAS ADVISED OF THE ALLEGATIONS OF THEFT AND SHE 
ADMITTED BEFORE A COURT THAT THAT'S WHAT SHE DID. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. DO YOU DESIRE TO BE 
HEARD FURTHER, MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: YES, ONE FURTHER POINT. IF THE COURT 
WOULD EVEN REVIEW THE AFFIDAVIT OF THE STATEMENT OF THE 
DEFENDANT THAT WOULD BE USED IN THIS COURT TO TAKE A GUILTY 
PLEA YOU WILL FIND ONE OF THE THINGS THAT YOU ADVISE THE 
DEFENDANT ABOUT IS THE PLEA ON THE CASE THAT YOU ARE DEAL-
ING WITH AT THE PRESENT TIME, IF HE ENTERS A GUILTY PLEA TO 
THAT, THAT COULD BE USED AGAINST HIM ON A SUBSEQUENT PROBA-
TION VIOLATION IF HE HAPPENS TO BE ON PROBATION. SO IT IS 
IN THERE. IT'S SOMETHING THAT THEY'RE SUPPOSED TO TELL 
SOMEBODY ABOUT WHEN THEY ENTER A GUILTY PLEA, THE FACT THAT 
THEY ARE ENTERING A GUILTY PLEA, THAT CAN BE USED IN SUBSE-
QUENT PROCEEDINGS ON AN ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE. AND THAT'S IN 
THE FORMAL AFFIDAVIT WITH THAT THAT ALL THE COURTS USE IN 
THIS JURISDICTION. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ON THE STATEMENT OF THE DEFENDANT? 
MR. BROWN: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WOULDN'T THAT GIVE A HIGHER BASIS 
UPON WHICH THE COURT COULD CONCLUDE THAT SHE WAS 
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KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT THE USE OF OFFENSES? 
MR. BROWN: IT CERTAINLY COULD, BUT SHE HAS TO 
BE—SHE HAS TO BE REPRESENTED BY AN ATTORNEY WHILE THAT 
PLEA IS TAKEN. SHE HAD NO REPRESENTATION WHATSOEVER WHEN 
SHE HAD THOSE GUILTY PLEAS IN THE LOWER COURT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IF I WERE TO FOLLOW WHAT YOU'RE 
SAYING, EVERYONE THAT IS ON PROBATION WOULD HAVE AN OBLIGA-
TION TO HAVE COUNSEL ATTEND THEIR SUBSEQUENT CHARGE-
MR. BROWN: OR—YEAH, GO AHEAD. 
JUDGE YOUNG: —BECAUSE IT MAY AFFECT THE UNDER-
LYING OFFENSE ON WHICH THEY'RE ON PROBATION. AND IF SHE 
ELECTS NOT TO HAVE COUNSEL, AND SHE ELECTS TO PROCEED, IT 
COULD BE VERY LIKELY WHAT SHE'S REALLY DOING IS THINKING, 
WELL, THIS IS A MINOR ENOUGH OFFENSE AND IN A SMALL COURT 
MAYBE I'LL—NOBODY WILL PICK IT UP. 
MR. BROWN: NO, I AGREE. THERE IS A SCENARIO 
THAT THEY CAN GO THROUGH WHEN THEY—TO WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO 
AN ATTORNEY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: BUT NO COURT IS REQUIRED TO ASK, 
WHEN TAKING A PLEA, ARE YOU ON PROBATION FOR ANOTHER OF-
FENSE, THAT THIS MAY RESULT IN YOUR VIOLATION, AND DO YOU 
UNDERSTAND THAT YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL TO ASSIST YOU 
IN THIS OFFENSE BECAUSE IT MAY RELATE TO THAT? 
MR. BROWN: NO, THEY'RE NOT REQUIRED TO INQUIRE 
AS TO WHETHER OR NOT THEY'RE ON PROBATION ON ANOTHER CHARGE 
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BUT THEY'RE REQUIRED TO TELL THEM THAT IF THEY ARE ON 
PROBATION THAT WHAT THEY'RE DOING HERE, BY ENTERING A 
GUILTY PLEA, COULD POSSIBLY RESULT IN A PROBATION REVOCA-
TION IN THAT OTHER CASE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. 
MR. BROWN: AND IF THEY'RE NOT GOING TO BE REPRE-
SENTED BY AN ATTORNEY THEN THE DEFENDANT HAS GOT TO KNOW-
INGLY AND VOLUNTARILY WAIVE THEIR RIGHT TO HAVE AN ATTORNEY 
PRESENT. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. WELL, THE COURT FINDS 
THAT THE STATE HAS BORNE ITS BURDEN OF PROOF IN ESTABLISH-
ING THAT THE DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE OFFENSE OF RETAIL 
THEFT. THE SALT LAKE COUNTY CASE NUMBER IS 93-1006041. 
AND THE DEFENDANT APPEARED BEFORE JUDGE DENNIS FUCHS ON MAY 
28TH, 1993 AND ENTERED A PLEA OF GUILTY WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES 
THE CONTEXT OF THE ALLEGATIONS AGAINST HER, THEREFORE, THE 
COURT FINDS THAT SHE HAS VIOLATED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS 
OF HER PROBATION IN RELATION TO ALLEGATION NUMBER THREE. 
NOW, IS THERE A RECOMMENDATION FROM ADULT PROBA-
TION AND PAROLE? 
MS. SHADOAN: YES, YOUR HONOR. AS YOU ARE AWARE 
WE HAD AN ORDER TO SHOW APRIL 19TH AND HER PROBATION WAS 
REINSTATED FOR 36 MONTHS. AT THIS TIME OUR RECOMMENDATION 
WOULD BE COMMITMENT TO THE PRISON. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. ANYTHING 
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THAT YOU WISH TO INDICATE TO THE COURT, MR. BROWN? 
MR. BROWN: WELL, YOUR HONOR, OBVIOUSLY I OPPOSE 
THE RECOMMENDATION THAT SHE BE COMMITTED TO PRISON. SHE'S 
GOT SOME SERIOUS PROBLEMS. THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT THAT. 
SHE INDICATES TO ME THAT SHE WOULD LIKE SOME HELP WITH 
RESPECT TO THE SHOPLIFTING PROBLEM THAT SHE APPARENTLY DOES 
HAVE. I THINK THAT WOULD CERTAINLY BE A LOT MORE APPROPRI-
ATE THAN COMMITMENT TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON. I WOULD 
THINK THAT WOULD BE A WASTE OF RESOURCES. 
I KNOW THAT THE COURT IS CONCERNED ABOUT HER 
BEING HERE BEFORE ON PRIOR OCCASIONS ON ORDERS TO SHOW 
CAUSE AND I KNOW THE COURT'S MADE SOME STRONG STATEMENTS 
WITH RESPECT TO THAT, BUT I WOULD RESPECTFULLY ASK THE 
COURT NOT TO SEND HER TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON. IF JAIL 
TIME IS APPROPRIATE I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO CONSIDER THAT, 
BUT I WOULD VIGOROUSLY RESIST, OR OPPOSE THE COMMITMENT TO 
THE UTAH STATE PRISON. I DON'T THINK IT IS APPROPRIATE IN 
THIS CASE. 
SHE HAS CHILDREN. SHE'S HAD MEDICAL AND FINAN-
CIAL PROBLEMS. THAT WOULD DO NOTHING TO SEND—IT WOULD 
SIMPLY WAREHOUSE HER FOR A PERIOD OF TIME. I WOLD NOT 
THINK THAT WOULD BE APPROPRIATE. 
JUDGE YOUNG: IS THERE ANYTHING YOU WISH TO 
INDICATE TO THE COURT, MS. CAPELLAN? 
MS. CAPELLAN: I DON'T KNOW WHAT TO SAY. I'M 
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SORRY. I DON'T KNOW WHAT TO SAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: YOU DON'T HAVE ANYTHING TO SAY? 
MS. CAPELLAN: WELL, I JUST WISH, YOU KNOW, I 
NEED HELP BUT I DON'T THINK THAT'S THE WAY TO DO IT. AND 
I'VE ASKED MS. SHADOAN FOR HELP AND SHE TELLS ME I HAVE TO 
PAY MY RESTITUTION FIRST, WHICH I DON'T HAVE THE MONEY TO 
DO. 
JUDGE YOUNG: WELL, I HAVE YOUR LETTER OF JUNE 
3RD THAT YOU'VE WRITTEN AND I'VE READ THAT LETTER. I 
RECEIVED IT ON THE 7TH OF JUNE. I WILL TELL YOU THAT MY 
NOTE IN THIS CASE, AND I PROBABLY TOLD YOU THIS, BECAUSE I 
WROTE IT DOWN, THAT AT THE SENTENCING I SAID, AND I WROTE 
ON HERE, IF SHE COMES BACK, SEND HER TO PRISON. I TOLD YOU 
THAT. 
MS. CAPELLAN: YES. 
JUDGE YOUNG: NOW YOU'VE COME BACK ON ANOTHER 
OFFENSE. 
MS. CAPELLAN: OKAY. 
JUDGE YOUNG: AND IN THIS PRESENTENCE INVESTIGA-
TIVE REPORT THERE'S A LOT OF INFORMATION ABOUT HOW YOU, AS 
YOU'LL RECALL, HOW INVOLVED YOU WERE IN THE DRUG SALE 
BUSINESS, THAT YOU UNDERSTOOD FULLY ALL THE TERMS, THAT YOU 
KEPT A $40.00 FEE FOR YOURSELF JUST FOR-
MS. CAPELLAN: I DIDN'T KNOW-
JUDGE YOUNG: — A COMMISSION. JUST A MOMENT. 
EILEEN M. AMBROSE, C.S.R. 00095 
I'LL LET YOU SPEAK. THAT YOU TOOK YOUR BABY WITH YOU WHEN 
YOU MADE THE SALE. AND SO I HAVE THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU 
HAVE NOT HAD A DESIRE TO STAY OUT OF THE VIOLATION OF THE 
LAW. 
MS. CAPELLAN: WELL, I HAVEN'T BEEN IN ANY TROU-
BLE. I BEEN ON PROBATION FOR THREE YEARS AND THIS IS THE 
FIRST TIME. 
JUDGE YOUNG: MS. SHADOAN? 
MS. SHADOAN: YOUR HONOR, MS. CAPELLAN MENTIONED 
THAT SHE HAS ASKED ME FOR HELP. I WOULD LIKE TO STATE TO 
THE COURT I HAVE ONLY BEEN HER PROBATION OFFICER FOR 12 
MONTHS OUT OF THE THREE YEARS AND STILL NOTHING HAS BEEN 
COMPLETED BY HER AS FAR AS HER PROBATION GOES. 
AND FURTHER, WHEN SHE WAS ARRESTED IN MY OFFICE 
HER DAUGHTER WAS WITH HER AND HER DAUGHTER WAS VERY HYSTER-
ICAL AND I ASKED MS. CAPELLAN AT THE ELEVATOR, WHILE TAKING 
HER DOWN ON THE WAY TO JAIL, WHY SHE WAS SUBJECTING HER 
CHILDREN TO THIS TYPE OF THING AND SHE SAID TO ME SHE FELT 
IT WAS A GOOD LESSON FOR THEM TO LEARN, THAT THEY'D LEARN 
NOT TO DO THINGS THAT WERE WRONG. AND I JUST FEEL THAT SHE 
HAS NO WANT TO EVEN COMPLETE THIS PROBATION. SHE HAS AN 
EXCUSE FOR EVERYTHING SHE DOES. SHE USES HER ILLNESSES, 
WHICH I KNOW ARE REAL, SHE USED HER CHILDREN AS AN EXCUSE 
FOR NOT COMPLETING THINGS. AND WE CAN'T KEEP SUPERVISING 
SOMEONE WHO DOESN'T WANT TO COMPLY. 
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JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU. ANYTHING 
ELSE ANYONE WISHES TO INDICATE TO THE COURT BEFORE WE DEAL 
WITH THIS MATTER? 
MR. BROWN: I HAVE NOTHING FURTHER. 
JUDGE YOUNG: ALL RIGHT. IT WILL BE THE DETERMI-
NATION OF THE COURT THAT YOU BE SENTENCED TO ZERO TO FIVE 
YEARS FORTHWITH TO THE UTAH STATE PRISON CONSISTENT WITH 
THE UNDERLYING CONVICTIONS IN THIS CASE FOR HAVING VIOLATED 
THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF YOUR PROBATION. I'VE ALREADY 
STATED THAT YOU VIOLATED CONDITION NUMBER THREE. 
MS. CAPELLAN, I REALLY BELIEVE THAT HAD YOU HAD A 
STRONGER DESIRE TO ABIDE BY THE LAW AND TO COMPLETE YOUR 
PROBATION YOU COULD HAVE DONE IT VERY EASILY. AND I AGREE 
WITH MS. SHADOAN THAT MOST OF YOUR CONDUCT HAS BEEN EXCUSES 
FOR MISCONDUCT. AND WHILE I WOULD PREFER TO HELP YOU AS 
YOU HAVE REQUESTED I THINK YOU NEED TO TAKE SOME STEPS IN 
THAT LINE YOURSELF. AND I THINK YOU'VE BEEN UNWILLING TO 
DO THAT. 
MS. CAPELLAN: I'VE TRIED TO GO THROUGH COUNSEL-
ING BUT FOR THE PROBLEMS THAT I HAVE YOU HAVE TO BE RECOM-
MENDED. EVERYBODY KEPT TELLING ME, YOU KNOW, FOR A CRIMI-
NAL YOU HAVE TO HAVE-
JUDGE YOUNG: OKAY. COURT'S IN RECESS. 
(WHEREUPON, THE HEARING WAS CONCLUDED). 
* * * 
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QERllZlQhXZ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, EILEEN M. AMBROSE, HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER OF THE STATE OF UTAH; THAT AS 
SUCH CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER, I ATTENDED THE HEARING 
OF THE ABOVE-MENTIONED MATTER AT THAT TIME AND PLACE SET 
OUT HEREIN; THAT THEREAT I TOOK DOWN IN SHORTHAND THE 
TESTIMONY GIVEN AND THE PROCEEDINGS HAD THEREIN; AND THAT 
THEREAFTER I TRANSCRIBED MY SAID SHORTHAND NOTES INTO 
TYPEWRITING, AND THAT THE FOREGOING TRANSCRIPTION IS A 
FULL, TRUE, AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPTION OF THE SAME. 
w
 EILEEy jfc. AMBROSE,'C.S.R. 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: 
JANUARY 14TH, 1996 
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ADDENDUM D 
iIRD CIRCUIT COURT 
afendant 
SLC 
C i t a t i o n : 
D O C K E T 
C94080 
Page 1 
MONDAY JUNE 21, 1993 
8:16 AM 
SLP Case: 931006041 MC 
Agency No.: 93-57809 
CAPELLEN, KATHY H 
1490 SOUTH 400 EAST 
#2 
SLC UT 84115 
City Misdemeanor 
Judge: Dennis M. Fuchs 
5/18/93 at 10:00 A in room 1 with ARR 
5/21/93 at 10:00 A in room 1 with ARR 
PRO:vATKIN, MARSHA 
C/O $505 B/W TO ISSUE 
OTN #: 094080 
harges 
Violation Date: 05/10/93 
1. RETAIL THEFT (SHOPLIFTING) 11.36.060 
Sev: MB Attrib: 0 
2. WARRANT OF ARREST FEE WARRANT FEE 
Sev: Attrib: 0 
roceedings 
5/11/93 Case filed on 05/11/93. 
ARR scheduled for 
5/19/93 ARR scheduled for 
5/21/93 Mis Arraignment JUDGE: T. PATRICK CASEY 
TAPE: 1101 COUNT: 1438 
ATD: None Present 
Deft is not present 
DEFT FAILED TO APPEAR 
5/26/93 Warrant ordered 
Warrant printed 
Warrant order updated 
BENCH WARRANT issued - JUDGE TPC 
Failure to appear for hearing 
Bail amount ordered: 435.00 
Warrant fee: 70.00 
Added WARRANT FEE to charge list. 
5/27/93 Warrant recalled on 05/27/93 because Booked 
Mis Arraignment JUDGE: FRANCES M. PALACIOS 
TAPE: 1149 COUNT: 1505 
ATD: None Present PRO: ZOLLINGER, STEVE 
Deft is not present 
ARR scheduled for 05/28/93 at 1000 
DEFT OUT TO ANOTHER COURT C/O CONT ARRN 
ARR scheduled for 5 
5/28/93 Mis Arraignment JUDGE: 
"'*£$> 
)  A,4fl'¥oom c£-'*?i,th ARR 
TAPE: 1126 COUNT: 
ATD: None Present 
Deft is present 
Chrg: 11.36.060 
Chrg: 1 1 . 3 6 . 0 6 0 c ® ^ i r i d i n g ^ d i 
C/O SNT: 5DJ/CTS TO CLEAR CASEe'^^.c^ ^ ^ \ 
Entered case disposition of: Clo 
Bail 
.00 
70.00 
LCK 
LCK 
LMC 
PLD 
PLD 
PLD 
PLD 
PLD 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
SCC 
LCK 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
MEM 
LCK 
BSM 
BSM 
BSM 
BSM 
--BSM 
BSh 
BSM 
CKO 
RD CIRCUIT COURT - SLC 
endant Citation: 
CAPELLEN, KATHY H 
D O C K E T 
C94080 
MONDAY JUNE 
SLP Case: 931006041 MC 
Agency No.: 93-57809 
City Misdemeanor 
Page 2 
21, 1993 
8:16 AM 
28/93 Judge ID changed from ARR to DMF 
Citation Amount: 
itional Case Data 
CKO 
Sentence Summary 
1. RETAIL THEFT 
Jail: 5 DA 
2. WARRANT FEE 
Case Disposition 
Disposition....: Closed 
Plea: Guilty 
Suspended: 
Plea: 
Personal Description 
Sex: F DOB: 01/17/54 
Dr. Lie. No.: 
Employer: 
Height: 0 00 Weight: 000 
Vehicle Year: 00 Make: 
Scheduled Hearing Summary 
ARRAIGNMENT 
ARRAIGNMENT 
ARRAIGNMENT 
ARRAIGNMENT 
State: UT 
Eyes: 
Model: 
Find: Guilty Plea 
Find: 
DATE: 05/28/93 
Expires: 
Soc. Sec. No.: 528 86 2442 
Hair: Race: 
Style: Color: 
on 05/18/93 
on 05/21/93 
on 05/27/93 
on 05/28/93 
1000 A in room 1 with ARR 
1000 A in room 1 with ARR 
1001 A in room 1 with ARR 
1000 A in room 7 with ARR 
End of the docket report for this case. 
